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the fine features and substance of the prior editions, and has
proceeded to even higher levels of scholarship; he has updated
and clarified, amplified and revivified the cornerstone of contract
law. Not only has Doctor Jaeger provided the bench and the
bar with the ultimate authority in the field of contracts, but he also
has provided an example of dedication and scholarship for his
confreres who desire to share their knowledge and love of the
law.
JOHN G. MCGOLDRICK *

By Roscoe
Pound. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1960.
Pp. 65. $2.50.

LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON.

As Dean J. Alton Hosch says in his Foreword, the School
of Law at the University of Georgia was chartered in 1859, and
a prospectus of the opening session on October first was issued
in June of that year. To inaugurate the Centennial Celebration,
Dean Emeritus Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School was
invited to give the lectures now published in this book. Neither
Dean Hosch nor Dean Pound mentions the unhappy occurrence
in 1861 of the firing on Fort Sumter, which, with its historic aftermath, undoubtedly affected the early days of this effort to advance
legal education from office apprenticeship training into regular
university studies. Dean Hosch does mention, however, another
happier anniversary, Dean Pound's ninetieth birthday, which occurred in 1960. Were this little book not remarkable for its
content it would still have a unique significance of its own.
As a matter of fact, those familiar with Dean Pound's long
list of distinguished publications in the field of jurisprudence will
find several new and welcome ideas expressed here. The author
does refer to some of his better known views, but he himself
tends to speak of them in the past tense, and hails more recent
developments as being of current significance. For example, he
mentions his former use of the word "social" in speaking of social
engineering or social interests, but notes that "social" has now
become an unpopular word. His earlier habit of speaking of
"received ideals" now yields to a new concern with "principles."
He shows the shift in emphasis from property to person, from
* Member of the New York Bar.
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"consideration" to promise, and from deduction to analogies, in
recent juridical reasoning; and devotes a whole lecture to the
trend away from "stare decisis," or stability, as an end in itself,
and toward treating the decisions as a means of finding justice
in changing situations. He does not, however, accept Judge Jerome
Frank's overemphasis on fact-finding as a judicial function, nor
does he accept codification as a suitable goal.
Briefly, he places a renewed reliance on the reasoning process
coupled with experience, and rejects the theory that law is binding
because it is politically enforceable. Obligation he considers more
moral than political, and based upon justice rather than formal
enactment. This he acknowledges to be a different foundation
from that of enforcement still currently held by many who were
trained in an era of "strict" law. His characteristic practice
of reading widely in comparative law fields, and especially among
contemporary jurists of the civil law system, tends to draw him
ever further away from the 19th century positivist schools. His
own development seems to be leading him away from an alien
philosophical idealism and back toward the moderate realism implicit in the common law.
The writers he mentions as important continue to include
Stammler, Kohler, and Radbruch. He is more impressed with
Bentham's procedural reforms, however, than with the latter's and
Austin's theories of law as sovereign command. He considers
the unification of commercial law since Mansfield a real advance.
And he relies on Coke, rather than Blackstone, for an exposition
of the "artificial" reasoning of the law. On page 28 he pays an
unusual tribute to Francois G6ny, saying that his "book has not
been appreciated as it deserves in the English-speaking world
which, perhaps, has been repelled by an atmosphere of Thomistic
orthodoxy which does not affect its intrinsic value." This recalls,
of course, Justice Holmes' opinion to the contrary in the latter's
petulant comment about natural law 1 in noting the appearance
of the G~ny volume that reached this country around 1918.
Dean Pound acknowledges on several occasions the importance
of philosophy in the development of law. He looks toward the
universal idea of the medieval jurists as a basis for the world
law needed today rather than to the enactments of a politically
organized world-state. He recalls that a council of the early
church, in a pronouncement of Christian morals incorporated in the
Corpus Juris Canonici, laid down faithful keeping of promises
as a tenet of Christian morals. Indeed he says that "philosophy
of law, as we understand it today, begins with St. Thomas Aquinas."

I Holmes,

Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1918).
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And he observes that "in 1891 Ihering noted a tendency to
depart from ideas which had governed the maturity of law," e. g.,
property was formerly valued over person, but now, person is valued
over property. Dean Pound is not quite conversant enough with
the "new jurisprudence" of the social encyclicals of Popes Leo
XIII and Pius XI (Pope John's Mater et Magistra was issued
in 1961, subsequent to these lectures) to remember that 1891
marked the appearance of Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII,
and that Ihering's recognition of a new trend was therefore not
surprising. There is, however, still lingering in Dean Pound's
memory the former attribution to Grotius rather than to Vitoria
of the foundation of international law, which suggests an inconsistency with his own rejection of the will-command theory of law
(closer to Grotius) in favor of the reason-justice theory (closer
to Vitoria). And he still speaks of the "emancipation" of jurisprudence from theology although he may be thinking of 16th
century theocracy rather than 13th century realism.
The wide learning characteristic of all Dean Pound's writings
is to be found in this book.
His ability to make jurisprudence
interesting as well as important is here as well. And his brief but
pointed allusions to matters that still puzzle law students, such
as consideration in contracts, causation in torts, lack of intent
in actions on the case or negligence, the narrowing of issues
in pleading, strict liability, property rights in oil and gas, injuries
arising "in the course of" employment, unjust enrichment, fictions,
good faith, and similar topics, tend to give new hope that contemporary students of the law may meet the need for greater
clarification more successfully than their predecessors have done.
If a challenge is expected, it also can be found here, where he
says: "There is need of study of reasoning from analogies in the
civil law, in the common law, and in the overhauling of law
which is going on today."' 2 For all these reasons this is a good
book to read, to buy, to keep. Both Dean Hosch and Dean
Pound are to be congratulated on this important commemoration
of the founding of the University of Georgia Law School one
hundred years ago.
MIRIAM THERESA ROONEY *
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* Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.

